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Abstract: 
 
 
At the beginning of the 1990s, in response to the increasing pressures of the international 
environment (the creation of the European single market and the Uruguay round of the 
GATT) and the sharp increase of unemployment, the Swiss government launched an 
economic program in order to “revitalise” the Swiss economy after the Swiss citizens had 
refused in a popular referendum to ratify the EEA Treaty in 1992. The major aim of this 
program was to liberalise the Swiss domestic markets. On the one hand, the program was 
focussed on the abolition of existing public monopolies (telecommunications, postal services, 
railways or electricity), thus following a common trend in European countries. On the other 
hand, the government also promoted the liberalisation of sectors, which were either 
previously self-regulated by the private actors or only weakly regulated by public law. This 
form of ‘laisser-faire’ has been very strong in the past and it led to various kinds of selective 
protectionist measures. In order to analyse the liberalisation and re-regulation processes of 
public monopolies and of previously weakly regulated economic sectors, we focus on two 
sectoral case studies: telecom liberalisation and the new regulations of public markets.  
 
The paper proceeds in two steps for each case study. First, we identify changes in the 
international environment and show in what way they affected the decision-making process 
on the domestic front. We shall notice in both cases an uncommonly strong leading role of the 
government and the federal administration (rather exclusive decision-making process, 
growing importance of regulation by means of decrees, selective concessions to only weakly 
associated opponents), confirming several hypotheses on shifts in the domestic power balance 
and amendments to the consociational style of decision-making. However, the empirical 
evidence also shows the persisting importance of institutional arrangements (federalism, 
facultative referendum) as veto points against exclusive and more majoritarian decision-
making.      
 
In a further step, we focus on the new forms and content of public regulations in the two 
liberalised sectors and particularly on the creation and the role of regulatory agencies, in order 
to identify the similarities and contrasts between the two processes of liberalisation and re-
regulation. We observe in both cases a pro-competitive re-regulation in terms of a limitation 
of the discretionary power of federal and cantonal governments. However, between the two 
analysed sectors, the instruments of re-regulation vary: in the telecom sector, regulatory 
agencies play a central role, whereas in the case of public markets, competition is mainly 
enforced by means of judicial review. In order to explain the new regulatory frameworks in 
the two sectors, we must take into account the domestic decision-making process as well as 
the model for regulation at the international level. 
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1. The 1990s in Switzerland: liberalisation under external pressure and 
institutional constraints 
 
In many respects, the 1990s can be seen as a turning point for the traditional economic 
policies in Switzerland. They stand in sharp contrast to previous decades, which were 
characterised by slow, incremental, and generally limited policy changes. In the first half of 
the 1990s,  some substantial reforms took place in various economic and social policies. 
Three factors were crucial for this shift: First, the recession and sharp increase in 
unemployment from below 1% to about 5% in 1994; second, the issues surrounding the 
Uruguay Round and closer ties with the EU, which, despite Switzerland’s failed attempt to 
join the EEA (the European Economic Area), stimulated major political debates and reforms; 
and third, pressures from the most internationalised sections of the business community for a 
change in the orientation of social and economic policies (for more details, see Bonoli and 
Mach 2000). 
In the field of economic regulation, profound changes also took place. The starting point for 
regulatory reforms originates in the debates on the European Economic Area Treaty (EEA), 
negotiated by the European Union and the EFTA countries. The Treaty implied the adoption 
of 60% of EU regulations by the EFTA countries. After three years of negotiations and an 
intense political debate in Switzerland in 1992, the Swiss citizens finally rejected the Treaty in 
December 1992 in a popular referendum by a large majority of cantons, but a very slim 
majority of citizens. 
 
After the rejection of the EEA Treaty and pushed to act by the context of increasing 
unemployment, the government launched a «economic revitalisation program» that was 
supposed to liberalise and deregulate the Swiss economy2. The program resulted also from the 
pressure exerted by a group of representatives of the most internationalised economic sectors, 
who had expressed their growing dissatisfaction with Swiss economic policies in a “white 
paper” in 1991 (Leutwiler et al. 1991). After this publication in July 1991, the Department of 
Economic Affairs appointed an expert commission, composed by managers of multinational 
companies and two professors for economics, to define the major orientation of the future 
economic policies. The increased domestic pressure contributed to the general perception that 
radical change was needed if the country wanted to maintain the high levels of prosperity it 
had known in the past.  
 
The success of the governmental reform program was not overwhelming in its degree of 
implementation, but it changed traditional features of some important economic policies. 
Inspired by economic studies, which showed that the major economic benefits of the different 
“European scenarios” would stem from the liberalisation of domestic markets (Hauser and 
Bradke 1992), the central aim of this program was to liberalise the Swiss domestic market. 
Among these measures, we can mention the reform of the agricultural policy under the 
pressures of the GATT-Uruguay Round, a new cartel legislation, the adoption of a new law on 
the internal market, the liberalisation of the public markets and the liberalisation (and partial 
privatisation in the case of telecommunications) of the major public monopolies (Post, 
Telecommunications, Railways and Electricity). Other major reforms of social and economic 
policies, not formerly part of the revitalisation program, were adopted during the same period. 
They included new more flexible regulations of the labor market, a reform of the pension 
                                                
2 The first part of this program contained the reforms of a large part of Swiss laws, which would have needed to 
be changed in case of the ratification of the EEA Treaty. 
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system, several unemployment insurance reforms and the introduction of value added tax 
(VAT). 
 
Among these numerous reforms of economic and social policies, the reforms concerning 
economic regulation and state interventionism demonstrate a progressive transformation of 
the role of the state as an economic actor and as a regulator of economic activities. We can 
thus identify the “rise of a regulatory state” (Majone 1996; Eberlein 1999) during the 1990s in 
Switzerland too, through the adoption of new public rules, awarding more power to 
independent public regulatory agencies and promoting market logic instead of arbitrary 
discretion by public actors (in case of public monopolies like the telecommunications) or 
protectionist arrangements among private associations (in case of highly self-regulated sectors 
like the public markets). 
Thus, the changing nature of state interventionism and public regulations concerned 
especially two dimensions. First, traditional state ownership of the major utilities, combined 
with a monopoly situation for these public enterprises (Post, Telecommunications, Railways, 
Electricity) has been called into question since the beginning of the 1990s. Similarly to other 
EU member states and following the new initiatives of the EU in liberalising economic 
sectors under previous public monopoly, the Swiss authorities also adopted decisions to 
liberalise their traditional sectors under public monopoly. 
Second, and this dimension is more specific to Switzerland, the Swiss economic development 
had been characterised by the central role of private actors as self-regulators of various 
economic sectors (cartel policy, where the cartel commission was composed by the 
representatives of the major organised economic interests, agriculture, where implementation 
is largely delegated to interest associations, banking regulation, foreign worker policy, setting 
of technical standards, etc…, see Hotz 1979)3. Thus, a general liberal trade policy had been 
combined in Switzerland with the introduction of various forms of selective protectionism 
organised by private actors or through specific public regulations. These traditional policies of 
selective protectionism have been increasingly called into question since the beginning of the 
1990s by the perspective of closer ties with the EU and by the representatives of the most 
internationalised Swiss companies, who did not tolerate anymore the costs induced by 
protectionist measures favoring mostly the domestic sectors of the Swiss economy.4 In that 
sense, the introduction or the reinforcement of public regulation in various sectors is today – 
paradoxically – an instrument of market-liberalisation. As underlined by Vogel (1996), 
liberalisation and re-regulation are thus simultaneous processes, which are shaped by political 
decisions. 
 
                                                
3 Historically, the early organisation of economic interests at the national level during the second half of the 19th 
century and the weakness of the central state, as well as the strong anti-interventionist tradition among economic 
and political elites explain the key role of economic associations in the political decision making process and the 
importance of the private self-regulatory role played by economic organisations. This led one of us, following 
the works of Katzenstein on the small European states (1984 and 1985), to define the Swiss case as a “liberal-
conservative” version of democratic corporatism, stressing the fact that a liberal foreign economic policy was 
compensated by the introduction of various national regulations preserving domestic economic sectors from a 
too intense international competition (for more details, Mach 2001). 
4 With the increasing international liberalisation of markets and therefore the growing independence of the 
export-industry, the cleavage among the internationalised economic sectors and those oriented towards internal 
market grew in importance (Sciarini 1994). This evolution gave rise to divergences and conflicts between the 
respective business interest organisations and in several cases even among the members of large parent 
organisations as the Swiss Federation for Commerce and Industry (USCI). 
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The changing nature of state interventionism during the 1990s can be illustrated more 
precisely by several policy changes: the complete reform of the “cartel law” (1995)5, the 
adoption of a new law on the internal market (1995), a new federal procurement law (1995), 
the reform of the agricultural policy (1995) and the liberalisation of the major public utilities: 
telecommunications (1991 and 1997), postal services (1997), railways (1998) and electricity 
(2000)6. During the 1990s, we can observe the progressive institutionalisation of a new 
regulatory framework, which concerns the whole economy, but with sectoral specificities.  
Despite not being member of the EU, changes in the international environment played a 
central role in triggering the liberalisation of several economic sectors in order to comply with 
international regulations produced either by the EU or the WTO. Non-membership in the EU 
and the Swiss tradition of private self-regulation or limited public regulation of economic 
sectors make the study of liberalisation under external pressures in this country particularly 
fruitful, since different patterns of liberalisation and re-regulation may be observed. For our 
two case studies (telecommunications and public markets liberalisation7), we will focus on 
how changes in the international environment affected the domestic decision-making 
processes and on the new regulatory frameworks introduced in each sector. 
In a first step, we shall highlight how the transformations of the international environment 
affected the traditional decision-making processes in the cases of telecom liberalisation and 
the reforms of public procurement policy. The external pressure has offered a window of 
opportunity to domestic actors (mainly the government and segments of the federal 
administration, sustained by pro-liberalisation interest organisations) for the achievement of 
reforms. We hypothesise that under such conditions the traditionally consensual decision-
making in Switzerland can be challenged, since the power relations among political and 
economic actors are affected. We expect an increasing role of the government being able to 
use the ‘external lever’ (Sciarini 1994; Mach 2001) in order to promote its preferences for 
reform at the domestic level and to overcome internal opposition. Thus we expect less 
inclusive decision-making processes (exclusion or only selective association of interest 
associations and cantons). However, given the institutional veto points of bicameralism, 
federalism and direct democracy (the role of the facultative referendum), we hypothesise that 
strong claims for compensation measures, specific to each case, will arise. Therefore, the 
resistance of some domestic arrangements to external pressures will also be taken into 
account.  
In a second step, we will analyse the content and the form of the new regulatory frameworks 
introduced in the two sectors. Following Vogel (1996), it is possible to distinguish different 
types of liberalisation and re-regulation where political processes are central in shaping the 
new regulatory framework. For Vogel (1996: 16 ff.), four types of regulatory reforms can be 
observed: two with emphasis on liberalisation (pro-competitive or strategic) and two on re-
regulation (juridical re-regulation and expansionary re-regulation). Even if we don’t agree on 
                                                
5 The content of the new “cartel law”, despite the restrictive limits of the Constitution (no interdiction of cartels) 
can be labeled as an “Helvetisation” of the European competition regulations. It gives decision competencies to 
the new “competition Commission”; a much clearer and severe appreciation of cartels and of abuse of dominant 
position is introduced, as well as a merger control mechanism; “rigid cartels” on prices, quantity and 
geographical allocation are considered as harmful and thus forbidden (for more details see Mach 2001, chapter 
4). 
6 We can add to this list the new regulations of the financial markets: reform of the company law (1992), new 
stockmarket law (1995) and the preparation of a new federal law on the accounting system of public companies.  
7 These two cases are a subset of the policies included in our research (see note1), which have been selected so as 
to achieve an encompassing view of the major reforms in the social-economic domain in the 1990s. In order to 
control for the effect of internationalisation on domestic decision al processes, we have also included reforms 
(e.g. pension schemes) where domestic considerations prevail.  
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all the aspects of Vogel’s analysis8, he provides some stimulating categorisations that specify 
more clearly the various possible liberalisation/re-regulation trajectories. In this second part, 
we will thus focus on the content of these new regulations, on their proximity with 
international regulations, and on the competencies of the newly created regulatory agencies in 
the two sectors. We hypothesise that the new regulatory framework adopted in the last decade 
in Switzerland under increasing international pressure will also depend on the previous 
institutional characteristics of the two sectors and on the decision-making processes which led 
to these reforms. 
In a third part, we will highlight similarities and differences between the two processes of 
regulatory reforms and in the content of the new regulations. In addition to the comparison 
between the two cases, we will also include some comparative elements with other countries. 
 
 
2. Telecom liberalisation: incorporating EU regulations 
 
Since the mid 1980s, the telecom sector has faced profound transformations around the world; 
these changes were driven by technological innovations, market liberalisation and ideological 
shifts among political authorities and combined with the emergence of new regulations at the 
international and national level. In Switzerland, major changes occurred during the last 
decade: complete liberalisation of the market, changing statute for the national public 
company with its partial privatisation and the adoption of a new regulatory framework 
providing new rules of the game for the telecom sector. 
Before these profound changes, and as in most other European countries, the Swiss PTT (Post 
and Telecommunications) had a monopoly situation on local and long distance services and in 
the provision of telephone equipment. The reforms of the telecom sector in Switzerland 
during the 1990s followed a parallel rhythm to the changes of the European regulations and 
proceeded in two major steps: a first reform of the telecommunications law in 1991 and a 
second one in 1997, just before the coming into effect of the European directives on the 
liberalisation of the telecom sector9. Despite the fact that Switzerland is not a member of the 
EU, the Swiss reforms clearly aligned on European rules. 
 
We will first recall the major elements contained in the reforms of 1991 and 1997 and then 
come back more specifically on the decision-making processes and the new regulatory 
framework. 
 
The 1991 Swiss reform of the previous law on telegraphy and telecommunications, which had 
been adopted in 1924, occurred simultaneously to the adoption of the first directives on the 
liberalisation of the EU telecom sector in 1990. However, the preparatory works on this 
reform had already started earlier at the beginning of the 1980s (see below for more details). 
The major elements of 1991 reform can be summarised as follows: the maintenance of the 
public monopoly of the PTT on basic services (telephony and network), combined with a 
liberalisation of the “value added network services” and of the terminal equipment; the 
splitting of the activities of market regulation and services provision, through the creation of 
the Federal Office on Communication (OFCOM), competent for the definition of technical 
                                                
8 Whereas Vogel (1996: 5) stressed that the “movement of global forces has reinforced national differences”, we 
come to the conclusion that the general trend is more toward a convergence of regulatory reforms, even though 
liberalisation/reregulation trajectories can preserve some sectoral or national specificities. 
9 On the liberalisation of the European telecom market, see Eliassen and Sjovaag 1999; Sandholtz 1999. 
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norms and for granting concessions to private actors10 as well as the prohibition of cross-
subsidisation between services in monopoly situation and those which were liberalised. This 
first reform was completely in line with the first directives of the EU in the field of 
Telecommunications liberalisation adopted in 1990. 
 
The telecommunication law adopted in 1991 was reformed a second time in 1997 in order to 
comply with the EU agenda of the total liberalisation of the telecom sector starting on the first 
of January 1998. Between 1991 and 97, several internal reorganisations had taken place11 and 
the law of 1991 had soon been considered as insufficient in comparison to the rapid evolution 
on the European level. The 1997 reform included two dimensions. First, the adoption of a new 
law on the statute of the telecom company, which included the complete separation of the post 
and telecom services into two separate companies: Post and Swisscom, the former 
transformed in a “établissement de droit public doté d’une personnalité juridique” and the 
latter transformed in a public company (Société anonyme de droit public), partially privatised, 
even though the federal state remains the majoritarian shareholder. The second dimension 
concerned the reform of the telecommunication law, liberalising completely the sector 
through the removal of the public monopoly on telephone services and cable-based 
telecommunications. With the creation of an independent commission on communication 
(ComCom), which, in collaboration with the OFCOM, would guarantee the free access on the 
telecom market, a complete separation of regulatory functions and operational activities is 
introduced (for more details, see below). The new law also provides a definition of the 
“universal service”, which is to be assured by Swisscom for the first five years after the 
coming into effect of the liberalisation. 
 
2.1. Decision-making under external pressure 
 
It is quite interesting to see that the two decision-making processes followed a very different 
trajectory: whereas the first reform took place in a traditional inclusive and consensual way, 
the 1997 reform was conceived by a small group of high civil servants without the creation of 
an expert commission. Traditionally, expert commissions, composed by representatives of the 
major organised interests and by scientific experts play a central role in the Swiss decision 
making process. It is generally during the pre-parliamentary phase (expert commissions and 
consultation procedure) that the general orientation of new laws is traced (see Germann 1985 
and Papadopoulos 1997, chap. 5). 
 
The preparatory works on the 1991 reform had already started in 1981. A first draft was 
published by the direction of the PTT itself, but several important political actors, among 
others the Swiss federation of commerce and industry (USCI)12, criticised the project and 
asked for the creation of an expert commission independent from the PTT. This expert 
commission, composed by representatives of the major economic interests, by independent 
                                                
10 However, the OFCOM remained part of the Federal Department (Ministry) of Environment, Transport, Energy 
and Communications (DETEC), but independent from the PTT company, previously responsible for the 
“homologation” of terminal equipments. 
11 These reorganisations were directed toward a more market and customers oriented strategy of the company. 
The possibility to develop an international strategy through cooperation was also facilitated by the modifications 
of different governmental decrees (for more details, see Pravato 1998: 148 ff.). 
12 Already in the 1980s, the USCI, representing the most internationalised economic sectors, put the question of 
telecommunications liberalisation as one of its priorities on its agenda. The major claim was to reduce costs for 
international communications (see annual reports of the USCI). When the government published its report in 
1987 for the first reform of the telecommunication law, the USCI complained that the reform was not sufficient.  
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experts and by high-rank civil servants was established in 1984 in order to elaborate a new 
project. In 1985, the expert commission transmitted its project to the Federal Department of 
Environment, Transport, Energy and Communications (DETEC) and, after approval by the 
government, the project was submitted to a general consultation. In December 1987, the 
government presented its project to the parliament. So even before the first concrete proposals 
at the European level13, the debates about a first step liberalisation in the telecom sector was in 
progress in Switzerland and sustained by some important economic actors.  
During the parliamentary debates from 1989 to 1991, the bill was amended by a very large 
majority in both Chambers in order to take into account the latest evolution of the EU 
regulations and to harmonise the Swiss law with the new EU regulations. Thus, the parliament 
went further in liberalising than it had initially been proposed by the government. It also 
introduced, as proposed in the Green paper of the European commission, a separation between 
operation and regulation with the creation of the OFCOM and the prohibition of cross-
subsidisation between sectors under monopoly and liberalised sectors. 
 
The second reform, voted in 1997, had started in 1993 and was clearly conceived and timed to 
come into effect on the 1st January 1998. The reform of the telecommunications law was part 
of global package of four laws, that included the transformation and the complete separation 
of the Post and the Telecom company and also the partial liberalisation of the postal services. 
Unlike the reorganisation and partial liberalisation of postal services, where a large expert 
commission composed by representatives of various interests groups (from industry to 
consumer associations) had been created to trace the major axis of the reform of the Post14, the 
first draft of the reform of the Telecommunications law was elaborated by a small group of 
high civil servants of the OFCOM, mandated by the DETEC. On the basis of two studies 
about the future of the Swiss telecom market from an English consulting group Analisis and a 
Swiss consulting company Infras, the OFCOM drafted a first reform proposal which was 
transmitted to the DETEC and the government. One of the major issues of the reform was 
about the complete separation between the Post and the Telecom company: whereas the 
direction of the PTT and the trade unions were in favor of the creation of a Holding society 
which would keep together the two companies, the government finally decided not to retain 
this solution and opted for a complete separation of the two companies with two different 
statutes. 
 
During the consultation process at the beginning of 1996 (see Report on the results of the 
consultation process, DETEC 1996), the governmental bill was largely approved, even though 
the trade unions expressed punctual critics. In summer 1996, after the consultation process, 
the government presented its “message” to the parliament; in April 1997 the complete reform 
of the PTT and the postal and telecom market were approved by the parliament. As quoted by 
Syz and Odermatt (1997: 63), the reform came only very late (in September 1996) in 
Parliament, which had to accept the new laws in a very short period of time if it wanted to 
stay in time with the EU agenda. Thus, no important changes were introduced during the 
parliamentary debates and the different laws were approved by a very large majority of both 
chambers.  
 
                                                
13 The Green paper on Telecommunications of the European commission, which contained major propositions 
about the liberalisation of the telecom market was published in June 1987 and approved by the European Council 
in 1988. 
14 At the end of 1993, the expert commission on the future strategy of the Post published a report on the 
“eurostrategy of the Post company”, which defined the major axis of the reform. 
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A facultative referendum was launched against the 1997 “reform package” of the four laws by 
some representatives of the left parties (extreme left and some sections of the social-
democratic party) and by some regional sections of the trade unions, even though the major 
trade union of the Post and Telecom sector didn’t back the referendum. These marginal 
opponents failed to collect the 50'000 signatures necessary to organise a popular vote, which 
would have delayed the coming into effect of the Swiss law beyond the deadline for European 
liberalisation. 
 
In order to explain the consensual character of the decision making process and the rapidity of 
the parliamentary debates, quite unusual for the Swiss political system, two factors were 
particularly important. First, the alignment of the national laws on the EU liberalisation and 
regulations was an omnipresent argument among political and economic actors to justify the 
reforms. Second, there have been some compensations between the telecom and post reforms: 
whereas the telecom liberalisation was completely in line with the EU trend, the liberalisation 
of the postal services remained less complete as in the telecom sector. Thus, the monopoly of 
the Post on packets was maintained at the level of 2 kg, whereas the liberalisation in the EU 
was already settled for packets at 0.35 kg15, and no independent regulatory agency was created 
for the postal sector. The left was very attentive to preserve the situation of the Post, directed 
by a social-democratic manager, against a too rapid liberalisation, whereas the rapid 
liberalisation of the telecom market was a priority for economic interests and the political 
right. 
 
In sum, three elements are most striking about the decision making process in the field of 
telecom liberalisation. First, the initial steps for a reform of the Swiss Telecom law had 
already started at the beginning of the 1980s, before the first steps towards a liberalisation of 
the European Telecom sector were announced in the Green paper of 1987. But the major 
changes in the EU and in the member states at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 
1990s accelerated and partly deepened the first liberalisation process attempted by the Swiss 
government. In the second reform, the time pressure linked to the complete liberalisation at 
the EU level played a central role in the timing and the content of the Swiss reform of 1997. 
Thus, it can be argued that the transformations at the EU level played a central role in the 
regulatory reforms of the Swiss telecom sector: first, changes at the EU level strengthened the 
domestic political and economic actors in favor of liberalisation, and second, they served as a 
major inspiration in the conception of the reforms. 
Second, we can identify an evolution toward a less inclusive decision-making process, 
especially during the pre-parliamentary phase. Whereas, during the first reform, a large expert 
commission was established to draw the lines of the content of the new law, the second 
reform proposal was elaborated by a small group of high civil servants of the OFCOM, whose 
proposal was adopted by the government. 
Finally, it should be stressed that the second reform was part of a “package deal”, including a 
complete transformation of the PTT. The opponents (trade unions mainly) or the skeptics (a 
large part of the social-democratic party) about the liberalisation trend of the telecom and 
postal services were partially satisfied by the less pronounced liberalisation of the postal 
service and did not oppose the reforms in the telecom sector. This explains the relatively 
consensual character of the decision making process and facilitated the adoption of the 
transformation of the PTT. Although the initial steps taken in the decision-making process of 
the second reform did not correspond to the inclusive Swiss policy style, the threat of the 
                                                
15 However, with the new postal law, the government will be responsible (and not any longer the parliament) to 
reduce the monopoly situation of the Post. 
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facultative referendum led to compensations in favour of possible “veto players” (mainly 
trade unions) about the postal reform and therefore to largely consensual decisions that did 
not deviate from traditional “Konkordanz” standards. 
 
2.2. An assessment of the new regulatory framework 
 
The liberalisation of the telecom market and the creation of new regulatory agencies 
constituted a complete transformation of the rules of game and of the functioning of the 
telecom sector, a process that was strongly influenced by the evolution at the European level. 
Thus, from a state company with a monopoly situation, controlled by the state and providing 
infrastructure for economic development16, we are witnessing the shift to a new logic of 
“market creation” (Wilks 1996). This transition process is characterised by the changing 
statute of the traditional State company with the attribution of a much larger autonomy and by 
the devolution of competencies traditionally in the hands of government to newly created 
regulatory agencies, responsible for the good functioning of market mechanisms. In addition, 
the new telecommunications law was deliberately formulated in general terms in order to 
allow the government (or the ComCom, or the OFCOM) to adjust by decree the national 
regulations to the evolution of EU regulations (FF 1996 III: p. 1431). 
 
Before coming to the liberalisation/reregulation process and specifying its characteristics, we 
will remind the profile of the newly created regulatory agencies, their role and competencies. 
Three regulatory agencies are now central in the functioning of the telecom sector: the 
OFCOM, the ComCom and the ComCo, the first two being specific to the telecom sector and 
the third one being a transsectoral authority. Concerning the implementation of the new 
Telecommunications law, the government and the DETEC are not authorised to give any 
instructions to the Comcom and the OFCOM (FF 1996 III: 1379). 
The OFCOM, despite being part of the DETEC, is subordinated to the Comcom concerning 
the application of the law and responsible for the technical aspects of regulatory activities. 
The ComCom is an independent commission, composed only by experts nominated by the 
DETEC, which is responsible for the attribution of concessions to companies active in this 
sector (mobile telephony, universal service, etc…). The ComCom and the OFCOM (about the 
technical elements) are also competent for the arbitrage regarding interconnection between 
networks if the different companies are not able to find an agreement, and for the allocation of 
frequencies and telephone numbers. 
The ComCom and the OFCOM have no competency on competition issues, but they have to 
collaborate with the competition commission (ComCo) in order to ensure that an “efficient 
competition” will prevail on the telecom market (article 1 and 23 of the Telecommunications 
law). The ComCo is an independent commission, composed by a majority of experts and 
some representatives of the major economic organised interests, nominated by the 
government. It has a decision competency to sanction anti-competitive practices, even though 
direct sanctions are not possible, since the Swiss competition law is based on the “abuse 
principle” (and not an “interdiction principle”). In addition, on issues of “public preponderant 
interest”, the government has the right to rescind a decision of the ComCo. 
 
Concerning the process of liberalisation and re-regulation, some important characteristics are 
worth being mentioned. First, the liberalisation of the traditional state companies enjoying a 
monopoly situation was preceded in major cases (telecommunications, postal services, 
                                                
16 State companies were able to promote industrial policy goals, regional economic development and social 
policy through their politically decided tariffs (see Pravato 1998).  
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electricity, railways) by the substantial reinforcement of the Swiss “cartel law” adopted in 
1995. In consequence, the new telecom law clearly stresses in its first article that the law 
should “allow an efficient competition in the telecommunications services”, which refers to 
the new “cartel law”17. But even before the coming into effect of the new telecommunication 
law, the newly created “competition commission” and its reinforced secretariat18 have been 
very active in the field of sectors previously under public monopoly to put pressure on the old 
state companies (a similar evolution is also under way in the electricity sector since 1999). 
Thus, between 1995 and 1998, the ComCo conducted several investigations in the telecom 
sector, but their results were mitigated. 
 
In a first step, the ComCo and the PTT signed in 1995 a “Verhaltenscodex”, which stated that 
the latter should not consolidate its position on the market before liberalisation. Every new 
acquisition by the PTT should be authorised by the ComCo. Despite this “Verhaltenscodex”, 
the PTT acquired an important participation (32%) in Cablecom, the major cable-network 
operator, in June 1996, one week before the coming into effect of the new “cartel law” and its 
merger control mechanism. It acquired thus a decisive position in the company and was able 
to prevent a too fierce competition by a potential competitor. The investigation of the ComCo 
came to the conclusion that the behavior of Swisscom would impede competition on the 
market and asked the government to constrain the PTT to abandon this participation19. The 
government did not follow the recommendations of the ComCo, but, in 1999, Swisscom 
finally sold its participation in Cablecom to the American company NTL.  
In 1997, the ComCo launched an investigation about Swisscom services for internet access 
(Blue window): in collaboration with the ComCom, it was able to prove that Swisscom had a 
dominant position on the market and that the costs of Blue Window were cross-subsidised 
with profits from the telephone sector (where – at that time – Swisscom had a monopoly), so 
that other providers were discriminated (for more details, DPC 1997/2: 161 ff.) After 
recourse, Swisscom finally gave up this practice and Blue Window had to change its business 
strategy. 
Finally, the issues about the tariffs for interconnection and the unbundling of the local loop 
triggered large debates between the regulatory agencies, Swisscom and private companies, 
complaining about the too high tariffs proposed by Swisscom. After decisions from the 
ComCom based on studies of the specialised consulting group Ovum and comparative results 
from other countries, Swisscom reduced its tariffs of interconnection. In October 2000, the 
ComCom took a new decision to oblige Swisscom to massively reduce its leased line prices 
(press release 3.10.200); in addition, the ComCom, based on an expert report of the ComCo 
about the situation on the telecom market, which concluded that Swisscom maintained a 
dominant position thanks to the interconnection practices, decided to oblige Swisscom to 
partially unbundle the local loop (press release 10.11.2000). In both cases, Swisscom 
contested the decision of the ComCom before the Federal Court arguing that the decisions of 
the regulatory agency were not based on the telecom law. 
We must, however, underline that, at the political level, after the coming into force of the new 
telecom law, some decisions were more favorable to the traditional operator: thus, for 
                                                
17 Similarly to the EU level (see Schmidt 1998), the new Swiss laws and regulations about the liberalisation 
process of traditional sectors under public monopoly are generally submitted to the general “cartel law”, even 
though the latter remains less severe than the European competition rules and Switzerland has no tradition of an 
active competition policy. 
18 Since the adoption of the new “cartel law” in 1995, the number of employees of the secretariat increased from 
10 to 45 in 1999. 
19 For more details, see the new publication of the ComCo: Droit et politique de la concurrence en pratique 
(DPC). 1997/1: 57 ff. 
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example, in December 2000, the parliament refused a proposition of the liberal party to 
completely “unbundle” the local loop. The recent proposition of the DETEC to completely 
privatise Swisscom also aroused much protest in the political left, the trade unions and partly 
among the right wing parties, too; a complete privatisation would require a mandatory popular 
referendum. 
 
In sum, we can argue that the actions of the newly created regulatory agencies were clearly 
directed towards the creation of a competitive market and the promotion of competition in the 
telecom sector, but these efforts remained partially attenuated because of the absence of a 
long tradition of an active competition policy, the resistance of Swisscom, which contested 
several decisions of the regulatory agencies before the courts, and the will of several political 
actors to preserve the traditional operator despite their previous decision to liberalise the 
telecom market. 
 
In conclusion on this first case study, we can say that, despite the various veto points of the 
Swiss decision making process (long and usually inclusive pre-parliamentary phase, perfect 
bicameralism and direct democracy, especially the threat of the referendum), the reforms of 
the telecom sector were profound and followed largely the evolution of the EU level, despite 
the fact that Switzerland is not part of the EU. It is also interesting to note that national 
regulatory agencies are constantly referring to international, especially  EU, regulations or 
practices and mandate, in order to justify their decisions, the same consulting companies as 
EU-member states. We can also underline that the liberalisation process led to a large 
delegation of competencies to independent regulatory agencies (ComCom and OFCOM, in 
collaboration with the ComCo), which have been very active in promoting competition on the 
new telecom market. Today, political authorities have much less control over the sector. 
 
 
3. Liberalisation and Re-regulation of Public Markets 
 
An economic study published in 1992 revealed that the average prices paid by the Swiss 
Government for typical public procurements (railway cars, office tables, street lamps etc) lied 
between 28 and 800 percent above prices paid in other European countries such as Great 
Britain, France or Italy (Scheidegger 1992: 186)20. In fact, until the beginning of the 1990s, 
public markets in Switzerland were only very weakly regulated by means of self-binding 
decrees adopted by governments at the national, cantonal or local level. Public procurement 
was used as an instrument for regional and structural economic policy. Thus, markets were 
closed and characterised by protectionist arrangements. Since the mid 1980s, however, 
liberalisation of public markets has become a major purpose of the Swiss Government, 
coinciding with - and certainly influenced by – the beginning of substantive regulation at the 
international level (Pravato 1995: 58). 
  
Our case study is structured as follows: first, international pressures will be identified, before 
focussing on their influence on domestic implementation and decision-making at the national 
as well as at the cantonal level. A third part finally deals again with the regulatory authorities 
responsible for the enforcement of the new legislation.  
 
                                                
20 The evaluation of price differences in percentages is based on the comparison of the average ‘Swiss’ price and 
the lowest price paid in one of the following countries: Germany, France, Italy, Great Britain, Belgium. 
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3.1. The legal international framework 
 
The source of external pressure on Switzerland in the case of public procurement reform was 
twofold. On the one hand, the Uruguay Round-negotiations led in 1994 to the GATT 
Agreement on Public Markets. On the other hand, the European Community developed since 
the mid-80s a lively activity in liberalising access to public markets among the member states. 
The ‘acquis communautaire’ on this issue was also part of the EEA Treaty between the EC 
and the EFTA-countries. Even though Switzerland is not EU member and refused to join the 
EEA in 1992, European legislation has, similarly to our first case, encouraged and accelerated 
the reform process in Switzerland.  
 
In the mid-1980s, the member States of EFTA and the EC declared the liberalisation of public 
markets a common goal and negotiations were started. In 1989, they agreed on including the 
issue in the European Economic Area Treaty (EEA). Switzerland participated in the 
negotiation of this treaty and was supposed and prepared to join it. 
The EEA Treaty aligned the norms of the EFTA countries on the EC-law, which was in rapid 
development. The European Commission had published in 1985 a white book, defining the 
liberalisation of public markets as a main element in the process leading towards the single 
market, a process that was supposed to be achieved by 1993. Following the white book, five 
directives were adopted between 198821 and 1992, building the regulative body that was 
finally integrated into the EEA Treaty. These norms apply on the federal as well as on the 
cantonal and the local level and on all types of public procurement (construction, delivery, 
and services) above certain thresholds. Furthermore, they include procurement in the sectors 
of water, energy, transports and telecommunication (WETT). In order to assure enforcement, 
bidders are given a subjective right to demand legal review by an independent authority.  
 
The first GATT Government Procurement Agreement resulted from the Tokyo Round in the 
1970s and came into effect in 1981. Although including the general principle of non-
discrimination, it had very little effect, since its scope of application was limited to few 
specific suppliers at the national level and excluded services as well as the WETT-sectors. It 
was only in April 1994, when the Uruguay-Round Agreement on Public Markets was signed, 
that an effective liberalisation started on GATT-level. The content of this second Agreement 
follows widely, as the EEA treaty, the EC-legislation. Nevertheless, with regard to the scope 
of application, it goes less far by excluding the local level and the telecommunications sector. 
Legal review is also guaranteed.  
 
In March 1994, shortly before the GATT Agreement was signed, Franz Blankart, the leader of 
the Swiss GATT-negotiation delegation, had announced to the European Commission that 
Switzerland was interested in negotiating on a bilateral extension of the GATT Agreement on 
entities covered by EC-law but not by the GATT treaty22. These negotiations started in Mai 
1994 and the bilateral agreement was signed in March 1997. Including local authorities and 
even private companies with a public license in the WETT-sectors, it is supposed to fill the 
remaining gaps between the GATT Agreement and EEA legislation. 
 
 
 
                                                
21 88/295/EEC; 89/440/EEC; 89/665/EEC; 90/531/EEC; 92/13/EEC. 
22 FF 1994, IV, 366ff. 
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3.2. Decision-making under external pressure 
 
Competencies for legislation on public procurement belong in Switzerland, according to the 
federalist structure, to the national as well as to the cantonal level. Therefore, domestic reform 
of public procurement has taken place in two distinct processes. Nevertheless, a link between 
the two levels is established by the Internal Market Law23, adopted in 1995, in which the 
federal Parliament prescribes the opening of public markets among the Cantons.  
 
3.2.1. Legislation on the national level: strengthened role of the Government 
 
The Government had adopted as early as in 1971 and 1975 two federal decrees on public 
acquisition and submission, stating the principle of non-discrimination. However, these 
decrees admitted exceptions from a competitive procedure, i.e. orders could be adjudicated 
directly to a particular company chosen by the public authority (Commission Suisse des 
Cartels 1988: 290). Moreover, the publication of orders remained mainly regional (Pravato 
1995: 50). Since, furthermore, the scope of application of the two decrees was restricted to a 
very limited number of authorities and objects and no enforcement authorities had been 
determined, they had virtually no effect.  
An effective reform could only be initiated in the beginning of the 1990s, when international 
pressure and the support of important internal actors coincided with Government’s preference 
for liberalisation. In fact, when the Federal Council launched its reform program in 1993 
including a reform agenda for federal as well as cantonal public procurement policy, it was 
actively supported by a group of neo-liberal economists and economic leaders representing 
the export-oriented sectors. Their preference for more competition and less tolerance towards 
protectionist practices (raising the level of domestic prices) can be seen as an expression of 
the generally growing importance of the cleavage between the most internationalised sectors 
of industry and the sectors oriented towards the domestic markets (see above) (Sciarini 1994). 
 
On the basis of its reform program, the Government decided in January 1993 that the two 
decrees should be brought into accordance as completely as possible with EC-law and the 
rules of the forthcoming GATT Agreement, on which negotiations were in progress. The 
reformed decrees were supposed to serve as a temporary solution after the EEA-defeat until 
the GATT Agreement would come into effect. This plan to align domestic rules on 
international law without yet being compelled to do so has been heavily criticised during the 
ensuing reform process, namely by business associations of the economic sectors oriented 
towards internal markets24. However, these actors had few opportunities to bring into account 
their opposition, because of the again quite unusual character of the decision-making process: 
the reform project was prepared during 1993 by the federal administration (Department of 
Finance and Department of domestic affairs) alone, without any interest group associated. It 
was only in the consultation process in autumn 1993 and in winter 1994 that the opponents 
could express their dissatisfaction with the exclusivity and the high speed of the process, as 
well as with the project’s content.  
The GATT-negotiations having come to terms in winter 1994, the Swiss government stopped 
the reform of the two existing decrees in favor of the creation of a new formal federal law. 
The shift onto an upper legislative level was, according to the Government, due to the 
                                                
23 RS 943.02 
24 Bericht über die Ergebnisse des Vernehmlassungsverfahrens zu den Entwürfen der Submissionsverordnung 
und der Einkaufsverordnung. Federal Department of Finance, 1994. 
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obligation resulting from the GATT-Agreement to introduce judicial review25. However, one 
could also hypothesise (as does Pravato 1995: 96) that it was mainly the heavy criticism 
expressed in the previous consultation process that made the Government give up the reform 
of the decrees and consciously select a different strategy in order to overcome domestic 
resistance against liberalisation. Actually, the impending GATT-Agreement allowed it to refer 
to an international pressure narrowing down the Government’s margin for reform. In fact, this 
pressure was quite welcome to the Government, since it sustained its own preference for 
liberalisation. The external pressure-argument was also used to justify the accelerated and 
simplified decision-making process for the new Public Procurement Law26. This bill was 
again elaborated without business organisations being associated in a representative 
commission, although several among them had explicitly claimed for its creation (Pravato 
1995: 94). Furthermore, the bill was submitted to consultation for only three months, together 
with the whole GATT-package and all related federal implementation acts, in summer 1994. 
In this consultation, the trade unions claimed for the introduction of a passage stating that a 
bidder would have to respect the rules on working conditions applicable on the place where 
the work would be executed, in order to avoid social dumping. The construction industry as 
well as the business association representing the domestic sectors (USAM) supported this 
claim, but mainly expressed a firm opposition against giving to the adjudicating authority the 
competence to negotiate with the bidders. However, the Swiss government left the possibility 
of negotiations in the bill. Instead, it added the obligation for bidders to respect local working 
conditions, going thereby deliberately beyond the GATT-Agreement (KBBK 2000: 20). One 
could argue that this concession to the left was made in order to help building a clear liberal-
social majority in favor of an otherwise very liberal Public Procurement Law. In fact, the 
Parliament maintained in December 1994 - after heavy discussions - extensive possibilities 
for negotiation and approved the bill in only about one week time without major amendments, 
although the opposition of a strong conservative minority against negotiation rounds with 
candidates had reappeared. The rapidity of the parliamentary approval was – besides the 
previous concessions made to the left - the result of the time pressure, under which the GATT 
Agreement had to be debated. 
Since the Public Procurement Law had been conceived as a framework law, all details were 
left to the level of the decree. Thus, the exclusive competence for further necessary legislation 
belonged to the Government, which actually adopted a Public Procurement Decree27 that 
exceeded largely the GATT-obligations. Aside the chapters detailing adjudication procedure 
and legal review, the latter contains also an entirely new part liberalising public procurement 
below the GATT-thresholds.  
 
In sum, we can observe that the decision-making process on liberalisation of public markets 
on the federal level has been less inclusive than what is considered as usual. At no point 
interest organisations were directly associated to the elaboration of the new rules. In that 
sense, the risk was taken to shift the conflicts to the parliamentary phase. However, by 
introducing the passage on the respect of local working condition into the bill, some 
opposition could be appeased. Furthermore, everyone - including the Government - knew that 
the parliamentary debates would take place under severe time pressure and would include a 
large variety of topics (the whole GATT-package). Thus, chances for having accepted rules 
                                                
25 FF 1994, IV : 1193. 
26 RS 172.056.1 The Law applies only to the federal level and to procurements above the GATT-thresholds. It 
includes furthermore a passage attributing to the Government the competence to extend its scope of application 
in case of further international agreements. A special recourse commission is created in order to decide on 
alleged violations of the law. 
27 RS 172.056.11 
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that would encounter strong resistance in a purely domestic and autonomous decision-making 
process were enhanced. 
It is striking to notice the similarities between the decision-making process on public 
procurement at the national level and the second reform of the telecommunications law. In 
both cases, the initial bills were elaborated by a small group of civil servants without wider 
association of interest groups. The relative closure of the process, as well as the rather passive 
role of parliament - in both cases put under time pressure in order to cope with the 
international agenda - might indicate tendencies towards a weakening of parliament28 and less 
inclusive decision-making in an internationalised environment.  
Furthermore, as for the case of the telecommunication sector, we notice a clear will of the 
national government to adjust rapidly to the international evolution, if not to anticipate it (cf. 
liberalisation by means of the two decrees). In the case of public markets, effective reform, 
however, was only possible when this will coincided with concrete international obligations.   
 
3.2.2. Legislation at the cantonal level: the importance of institutional constraints 
 
Liberalisation of the highly protected internal markets, i.e. the abolition of protectionist 
arrangements and of economic boundaries among the 26 Swiss cantons, was one of the aims 
of the reform program that followed the rejection of the EEA Treaty. The project for an 
Internal Market Law, published in November 1994, focussed on the abolition of legal 
obstacles to competition and mobility among the Cantons by introducing on the State level the 
“Cassis-de-Dijon” principle29, which governs free movement of goods in the EU. It also 
included a section on liberalisation of cantonal public markets even below the GATT 
thresholds. An expert commission consisting of members of the federal administration and 
specialists for commercial law was created in order to elaborate the bill. The cantonal level 
was represented in the commission by only two civil servants responsible for European 
matters in their cantons. No interest association was represented. Instead, some of them, as 
well as some representatives of the cantons could express their opinion in informal hearings 
during September 1993.  
The project and especially its section on public markets encountered heavy criticism in the 
consultation process30. A majority of the cantons rejected the inclusion of public market 
liberalisation as interference in their sovereign competencies. They got support from 
conservative political parties and the business associations representing the domestic sectors 
(USAM) and the construction sector. The Swiss federation for commerce and industry 
(USCI), in general a pro-liberalisation actor, was internally split on this issue and adopted a 
more hesitant position, demanding the regulation of cantonal and national public markets in a 
separate bill. With regard to these objections, negotiations between representatives of the 
Conference of Cantonal Governments and the Federal Department of Finance took place 
following the consultation process. Finally, the text was amended in order to preserve to a 
large extent the cantonal autonomy. It was notably mentioned explicitly that federal law was 
subsidiary to cantonal law, on condition that minimal principles as the non-discrimination in 
mutual market-access and legal review would be guaranteed. The competencies of the ComCo 
                                                
28 The pre-parliamentary phase is decisive in the formation of compromises, whereas the role of the parliament 
seems limited to confirm the previously reached agreement or to minor adjustments. 
29 The principle of ‘Cassis de Dijon’ stems from a verdict of the ECJ. It states that access to market for goods, 
services and commercial activities depends on the law of the place of provenience. It implies thus mutual 
recognition of the other member State’s law. In Switzerland, the principle applies to commercial relations among 
the 26 Cantons. 
30 Report on the results of the consultation process on the project of a new Internal Market Act, Federal 
Department of Finance, 1994. 
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as the authority in charge for supervising cantonal liberalisation were considerably weakened 
after the consultation process (see below). Furthermore, a passage on the national 
Government’s competence to promote actively intercantonal collaboration by means of 
comparative studies and reports was crossed out in Parliament on demand of the defenders of 
a strict federalism. This weakening of national interference in cantonal sovereignty allowed a 
compromise between the conflicting interests of the two State levels. 
However, the principles of judicial review and of liberalising cantonal public markets even 
below the GATT thresholds remained in the Internal Market Law31. This is important, since a 
vast majority of cantonal procurements (about 80%) are below these thresholds. The Internal 
Market Law thus imposes to cantons a degree of liberalisation that goes beyond the 
international obligations. However, the federalist opposition of the cantons allowed them to 
water down the initial bill to a few very general principles. Thereby, they preserved a large 
margin for autonomous legislation. In practice, liberalisation below the thresholds was until 
1999 implemented to a very unequal degree, some cantons setting up very low proper 
thresholds, while others continued considering the GATT thresholds as authoritative. The 
limited competencies of the national administration and of the ComCo to enforce cantonal 
liberalisation made harmonisation on this issue difficult to achieve.  
 
Simultaneously to the Internal Market Law, a second decision-making process took place at 
the intercantonal level. This process was driven by a twofold source of pressure: the 
international level (EEA and GATT) and legislation on the national level (Internal Market 
Law).  
Expecting the adoption of the EEA Treaty, the Conference of Cantonal Ministers for 
Construction had mandated an expert group32 for the elaboration of the principles for 
liberalisation. After the rejection of the Treaty in 1992, the Conference decided to pursue its 
efforts for two reasons. On the one hand, most cantonal governments as well as business 
interest groups operating at an intercantonal level were willing to harmonise cantonal law to 
some extent and on the other hand, it was clear that the expected GATT-Agreement would 
make some liberalisation unavoidable. The Intercantonal Agreement on Public Markets33, 
signed in November 1994, was limited to liberalisation above the GATT-thresholds34, because 
the cantonal governments refused a wider intercantonal harmonisation in order to preserve 
their autonomy. One can thus notice the reactive character of cantonal legislative activity. 
Substantive liberalisation above the GATT thresholds was only achieved under pressure of 
the international level and the cantons only very reluctantly adopted wider liberalisation 
below the high thresholds under pressure of the Internal Market Law.  
 
In sum, as for the liberalisation on the national level, we can observe an uncommonly 
exclusive decision-making process for the Internal Market Law. Interest associations and 
cantons – even though mostly concerned – were only associated in informal hearings. 
Federalism, however, proved to be an important obstacle to (rapid) liberalisation beyond 
international obligations, since the cantons managed to reduce the compulsory character of the 
Internal Market Law in several points. First, priority of (inter-)cantonal law was maintained. 
                                                
31 Transparency, i.e. the publication of an offer in an official document is, however, only required for ‘important 
procurements’. It is not specified above which thresholds procurements are considered as ‘important’. 
32 The expert group was composed by three mandated lawyers as well as by representatives of the cantons and 
one federal civil servant. In practice, however, the principles were elaborated by the lawyers, who presented in 
regular intervals their proposals to the other members of the group. 
33 RS 172.056.4 
34 The Conference of Cantonal Ministers for Construction had initially presented a more ambitious project in 
winter 1994, in which liberalisation was proposed below the GATT-thresholds. 
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Second, federal competence to encourage actively intercantonal collaboration and 
harmonisation was crossed out. Finally, the competencies of the Competition Commission for 
supervising the implementation of the Law were restricted (see below). Nevertheless, the 
national government put pressure on the cantons by means of the Internal Market Law, 
accelerating thereby intercantonal liberalisation (under the threat of further restriction of the 
cantonal sovereignty). Federalist opposition managed to slow down the liberalisation of 
cantonal public markets, but not to impede it. 
 
3.3. An assessment of the new regulatory framework 
 
The reform of the Swiss public procurement policy since the beginning of the 1990s pursues 
the objective of abolishing the previously widespread protectionist practices at all state levels. 
As in the telecommunication case, we are thus in presence of a new logic of market creation. 
The enforcement of this new policy is mainly based on legal review. In addition, the 
Competition Commission as an independent transsectoral authority is competent for 
supervising the implementation of the Internal Market Law, i.e. the opening up of public 
markets at the cantonal level. However, its competencies and therefore its impact are less 
important in the case of public procurement than in the case of the telecommunication sector, 
mainly because of federalist reluctance against extensive national control. In addition to 
courts and the ComCo, and as a result of the adoption of the Bilateral Agreement with the EU, 
a commission composed by an equal number of high civil servants of the national and the 
cantonal level has recently seen its competencies enlarged in order to supervise the keeping of 
international obligations on public markets liberalisation. 
 
3.3.1. Regulatory Agencies 
 
The Competition Commission is empowered by the Internal Market Law to supervise the 
implementation of the Law at the cantonal level. It is competent for addressing 
recommendations to the administrative and judicial authorities and for elaborating expert 
reports. Its activities imply mostly the abstract control of cantonal legislation, but also - to a 
minor extent – the concrete control of cantonal adjudication.  
First, the ComCo controls the adjustment of cantonal legislation to the Internal Market Law. 
Cantons and local governments can ask the ComCo for judicial advice on a bill, but the 
commission has also the right to examine spontaneously cantonal bills and to evaluate their 
conformity to the Internal Market Law. Until 1998, the ComCo had given comprehensive 
advice to 7 cantons and consulted several others on specific issues. However, the 
recommendations of the ComCo are not compulsory. Furthermore, experience has shown that 
the ComCo is often not informed on planned bills, since there exists no such obligation for the 
cantons (Zäch 1998: 67). Although further investigation competencies (obligation for 
collaboration and information etc) had been proposed in the governmental bill, they were 
crossed out in Parliament on demand of representatives of the cantons (Cottier and Wagner 
1995: 1589). The lack of these competencies has revealed to be a major obstacle to an 
efficient control by the ComCo.  
Second, on demand of the administrative or judicial authority in charge, the ComCo can 
deliver an expert opinion on adjudication decisions a bidder has appealed against. However, 
as in the first case, the commission’s recommendations have no compulsory effect. 
Furthermore, in practice the ComCo’s expert advice has yet never been heard by a court or a 
recourse commission and the following example illustrates the limited scope of its 
competence to intervene. In 1997, the local authorities of the city of Geneva had attributed to 
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a private company the exclusive right to post advertisement bills. One of the unfortunate 
bidders then brought charges against the authority to the cantonal administrative court. At the 
same time it asked the ComCo to elaborate an expert opinion on this case. The ComCo, 
however, refused the request, since it ought to come from the court itself and not from the 
plaintiff. Some versions of the initial governmental bill had included the court’s duty to hear 
the ComCo’s advice (Cottier and Wagner 1995: 1590), but that was excluded after the 
negotiations with the cantons.  
 
We observe that the Commission has in the case of public procurement an assisting and 
consulting function on cantonal legislation, rather than effective competencies to sanction 
ascertained violations of the Internal Market Law or to bring charges against adjudication 
authorities. Thus, claims for further competencies for the Competition Commission have 
begun to arise35. In sum, as in the telecommunication sector, the ComCo plays a clearly pro-
competitive role. However, its competencies are weaker. This fact is a result of the federalist 
structure, which generated strong opposition against a national ‘guard’ supervising 
liberalisation at the cantonal level36.   
 
A second commission, bringing together high civil servants of the cantons and of the national 
level has been created in 1995 by decree of the Government. It is supposed to consult the 
Government in further international negotiations on the issue and to allow the exchange of 
opinions between the cantonal and the national level. This commission has seen its 
competencies enlarged with the adoption of the Bilateral Agreement between Switzerland and 
the European Union, because this agreement commits each partner to the creation of an 
independent supervising commission. Despite the resistance of the cantons, which feared 
further interference (Lang 1998: 43), the commission will in the future be enabled to take 
administrative and judicial measures against adjudicators breaking the international law. It is, 
however, not yet possible to predict whether this empowerment will have a significant impact 
on market regulation. 
 
3.3.2. Judicial review 
 
Given the weak competencies of the ComCo, the enforcement of public markets regulation at 
the cantonal as well as the national level has depended up to now almost only on the right of 
private bidders to demand legal review. 
The Public Procurement Act created newly a Federal Recourse Commission, which is solely 
competent at the national level for alleged violations of the law concerning the procedure or 
the decision of adjudication. Since the Commission has no competence to investigate or to 
sanction spontaneously, it must be seen as a judicial body rather than a regulatory agency. 
                                                
35 Zäch (the vice-president of the Competition Commission) demanded that cantons should be compelled to 
inform the commission on their legislative activities and that the commission should have the right to intervene 
spontaneously in an ongoing trial (1998 : 59ss). In a report on the implementation of the Internal Market Act, a 
parliamentary commission suggests that the Competition Commission should have the competence to formulate 
complaints against authorities denying the free access to internal markets (Geschäftsprüfungskommission 2000 : 
12).  
36 The Federal Supreme Court has up to 1999 adopted a rather restrictive interpretation of the Internal Market 
Law, privileging the cantonal autonomy at the expense of the liberty of commerce. Hence, the pressure for 
adjustment of the cantonal legislation and therefore ComCo’s ability to enforce free market-access are even more 
weakened (Geschäftsprüfungskommission 2000: 12). 
 20 
At the cantonal level, the Intercantonal Agreement, in accordance with the Internal Market 
Act, defines the ordinary cantonal courts as the competent review bodies. Recourse in front of 
the Federal Supreme Court is also guaranteed. 
 
 
In conclusion to the case of public markets, we notice that our hypotheses on the shifting 
nature of the Swiss decision-making processes under international pressure have been 
verified.  
The external influences offered a window of opportunity for the Swiss government to achieve 
liberalisation at the national as well as at the cantonal level. At the national level, the 
relatively closed decision-making process, the almost complete exclusion of interest 
organisations, the selective concessions made to the parliamentary left and the extensive 
competence to regulate public markets by means of decrees allowed the government and the 
administration to circumvent protectionist resistances. It is at the cantonal level that the 
weight of institutional structures came most to the fore. Even though the national government 
had initiated a similarly closed and selective decision-making process as for the reform of 
national public markets, Swiss federalism made cantons become a key actor. If they were 
unable to prevent completely ‘national’ opening of their markets, they still managed to water 
down significantly the governmental bill and to preserve a large part of their autonomy. It is 
interesting to notice that the decisive negotiations between the cantons and the national 
administration took place in informal and unplanned meetings after the consultation process, 
which had revealed an unexpectedly strong opposition. The cantons were thus able to break 
the unusually closed process in order to make themselves heard. Nevertheless, international as 
well as national pressure on the cantons initiated and accelerated intercantonal co-operation 
and liberalisation of cantonal public markets. 
 
As to the new regulatory framework, liberalisation and regulation by means of judicial review 
is less controllable and therefore weaker than enforcement through independent agencies 
enabled to sanction spontaneously violations of the law, since it relies only on the action of 
private bidders. In order to explain why Switzerland has chosen this regulatory arrangement 
in the sector of public markets, one can first mention federalist opposition and second the 
international regulative ‘model’ of the EU granting legal rights to bidders. In countries such as 
Germany (Lodge 2000) and Austria (Casati 1998), legal review of adjudication decision takes 
place only on appeal to the review body. In both countries, no independent agency is enabled 
to initiate spontaneously investigation procedures or to sanction authorities breaking the law. 
However, the arrangement of review bodies differs widely from one country to another. In 
Germany, complaints are, in the first instance treated by the independent “Vergabekammern”, 
assigned to the Federal Cartel Office. The Upper State Courts (“Oberlandesgerichte”) act as 
the second and final instance. This model combines rapid decision and expertise with the 
possibility of judicial review. The “Vergabekammern” seem to be similar to the Federal 
Recourse Commission, competent on review at the national level. In Austria, as in 
Switzerland, the two State levels display distinctive regulative arrangements. The Control 
Commission (“Vergabekontrollkommission”), which acts as a first instance at the federal 
level, tries to reach an amicable settlement of the conflict. It is only after this attempt failes 
that an appeal to the Public Procurement Agency (“Bundesvergabeamt”) can be made. The 
Austrian Administrative Court decides as the last instance on the alleged violation of the law. 
The Länder have transposed differently the EU directives. Four among them have assigned 
the competence for judicial review to already existing administrative tribunals, whereas the 
remaining five have newly established separate State Procurement Agencies 
(“Vergabekontrollsenate”). Thus, even though review occurs in all countries only on appeal, 
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its arrangements differ between countries and even within them. Further comparative research 
is, however, needed in order to determine the relative effectiveness for enforcement of the 
different regulative arrangements.  
 
4. Some cross-sectoral and cross-national comparative elements 
 
In the case of telecom liberalisation as in the case of public procurement reform, changes in 
legislation and in the regulatory framework at the international level (be it in the EU or the 
GATT/WTO) have profoundly affected domestic policies. As to the nature of the external 
pressure, one can distinguish between judicial and more economic pressure. In fact, economic 
pressure for liberalisation can be identified as having been decisive in the telecom sector, 
because the rise of a “supranational regulatory regime” at the European level (Sandholtz 
1999) left little possibility for divergent solutions at the national level, if Switzerland wanted 
to avoid economic marginalisation. In the public markets case, binding judicial engagements 
of Switzerland in multilateral agreements (the GATT Agreement and the Bilateral Treaty with 
the EU) were more important. However, considering the fact that these agreements were 
signed in order to gain access to markets abroad, economic pressure might have been decisive 
as well. In both sectors, whether binding agreements existed or not, Switzerland adjusted to 
the newly created international regulations.  
 
One of the most striking results of the two case studies is the rapid adjustment of Swiss 
legislation to changes in the international environment, and in both cases even a will of the 
federal government to anticipate them. This holds true despite the fact that in both sectors, the 
“goodness of fit” of the previous domestic structures with respect to the evolution at the 
international level (EU and GATT) was weak. Hence, compliance towards the newly created 
international regulations needed important changes of the domestic policies and institutional 
structures. It was the actual coincidence of regulation at the international level and domestic 
pressure for reform that allowed the opening of public markets at the national level (Public 
Procurement Law) as well as the acceleration and deepening of the first liberalisation process 
in the case of telecommunication. The major lesson is that when external pressure appears as 
a stimulus for reform, the Swiss political system displays quite a strong capacity to 
adaptation, which is not congruent with what we know about its usual operative standards.  
This form of discrete and from issue to issue europeanisation also stands in sharp contrast to 
immobility as to EU membership. Even though Switzerland is not a member of the EU and a 
majority of the Swiss people shows little interest in becoming one37, the two case studies, 
exemplary for a set of major reforms in the 1990s, clearly display a form of - at least partial - 
integration.  
 
In order to present now some comparative elements on the reform processes in the two 
analysed sectors, we will structure the argument around two topics: the decision-making 
processes and the new regulatory frameworks.  
 
4.1. Less inclusive decision-making, institutional constraints and consensual output 
 
The two case studies of domestic reform under external pressure reveal an uncommonly 
strong leading role of the government and of the federal administration in the decision-making 
                                                
37 This has recently been confirmed by a referendum vote where an overwhelming majority of the Swiss 
population rejected a proposition that would oblige the federal government to start immediately negotiations on 
EU membership with Brussels.  
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processes. In the case of the second reform of the telecommunications law as in the case of 
public markets liberalisation at the national level, a rather exclusive decision-making process 
and the growing importance of regulation by means of decrees express a shift in the domestic 
power balance in favor of the federal administration and at the expense of the traditional 
economic organised interests38. In fact, in both cases neither the interest organisations nor the 
cantons were represented in an experts commission in the pre-parliamentary phase and the 
parliament was in both cases put under time pressure due to the international agenda. Thus, 
the federal administration sought and succeeded in these two reform processes to keep the 
upper hand, trying to leave aside both interest groups and subnational units whose cooperation 
is usually one of the distinctive features of Swiss “consociationalism” (Kriesi 1998, Linder 
1999). Furthermore, the Public Procurement Law as well as the new telecommunication law 
are deliberately formulated in general terms leaving legislation on important regulative 
measures to governmental and administrative decrees.   
 
However, although these two decision-making processes were less inclusive, the reforms were 
accepted by rather large majorities in the parliamentary arena39. In fact, the leading role of the 
Government did not generate a particularly high polarisation, mostly because large coalitions 
in favor of the reforms had been deliberately built by means of concessions to the “losers” of 
the reform processes (trade unions and domestic economic sectors). In both cases, the general 
lines of the reforms were drafted by a small group of high civil servants and of “independent” 
experts; after that, some concessions were made to the opponents. This strategy allowed 
overcoming the veto points of the parliamentary phase and the facultative referendum. Thus 
we notice that – because of the institutional veto points - even the uncommonly exclusive 
decision-making processes led to a rather traditional consensual output, either because of the 
marginalisation of the opponents or because of the inclusion of the reform in a more global 
“package deal”. This is a partial shift from standard decisional processes in Switzerland, 
where most conflicts are settled as soon as possible, at the risk of blocking ambitious reforms. 
The new recipe here consisted in initiating reforms in a top-down manner, and in watering 
them down only subsequently so as to ensure their acceptance.  
 
The persisting overall importance of institutional veto points is clearly confirmed in the case 
of liberalisation of public markets at the cantonal level by means of the Internal Market Law, 
where - unlike for telecom liberalisation and public markets at the national level – the 
federalist structure played a major role. National government did not manage to impose a 
similarly closed decision-making process. Instead, it had to associate the – initially only very 
weakly represented - cantons in unplanned negotiations after the consultation process. In 
order to respect cantonal autonomy, the compulsory character of the national regulation has 
been reduced in these negotiations and further limitation of its scope has occurred in 
Parliament. Nevertheless, the government and the federal administration remained central 
actors initiating and pushing liberalisation at the cantonal level. Federalist resistance slowed 
down the reform process, but did not prevent it.  
 
 
 
                                                
38 This is similar to what Knill and Lehmkull (2000) portray as a change in the opportunity structure, although 
we believe the way the authors use this concept is different from the original meaning given by Kitschelt. 
39 In the final vote, the Public Procurement Law was voted by a 142:35 majority in the lower chamber and by a 
34:5 majority in the upper chamber (16th December 1994). The Telecommunications Law by a 117:10 majority 
in the lower chamber and by a 39:0 majority in the upper chamber (the 30th April 1997). Such large majorities 
are, however, common in Switzerland.  
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4.2. New regulatory frameworks: adjustment without integration 
 
Both cases illustrate the changing nature of state interventionism, where state control over 
industry and services is undermined, and the establishment of new regulatory frameworks, 
where pro-competitive re-regulation takes place through different instruments (see Vogel 
1996: 17). In both cases, the discretionary power of government was reduced, in the sense that 
at the federal as well as at the cantonal level, state authorities cannot decide anymore in a 
discretionary manner to sustain the still state owned telecom company or to favor local 
companies in the adjudication of public markets. Instead, they have to comply with the new 
regulatory frameworks. 
In both sectors, we note the adoption of new regulations and the creation of new regulatory 
agencies with enlarged competencies: the ComCom and the OFCOM in the telecom sector; 
the Federal Recourse Commission and the independent commission supervising compliance 
with international obligations in public procurement. In addition, the recently empowered 
Competition Commission, as a transsectoral authority, is competent on competition issues in 
both sectors, but with different competencies: in the case of public markets, the preservation 
of cantonal sovereignty reduced the scope of competencies of the ComCo, whereas in the 
telecom sector, the ComCo, in collaboration with the ComCom, was able to become more 
influential in promoting competition. 
Between the two sectors, the instruments of re-regulation vary: in the telecom sector, the 
newly created regulatory agencies, with enlarged competencies, play a central role, whereas in 
the public markets liberalisation, new and more precise rules were adopted, giving the right to 
private actors to contest decisions of state authorities at the federal and cantonal level.  The 
ComCo has only a supervisory and consultative role in the adoption of cantonal regulations. 
 
As to the interaction between the national and the international level of regulations, it is 
interesting to note that Switzerland, despite not being a member of the EU, followed to a large 
extent EU regulations in both cases. Even though a more detailed comparison would be 
needed, we can say on the grounds of our two case studies that there is not much Swiss 
exceptionalism in policy content. In the telecom sector, the Swiss authorities deliberately 
aligned Swiss regulations to the European ones. In addition, it is worth mentioning that the 
institutional arrangement of the new regulatory framework in the telecom sector displays very 
similar characteristics to the German or the Dutch case (Werle 1999 and Levy-Faur 1999). In 
the case of public markets, the Swiss case shows similar patterns of regulatory activities to 
Austria and Germany (see above, Lodge 2000 and Casati 1998), in the sense that legal review 
occurs only on appeal. No independent authority is enabled to investigate or sanction 
spontaneously violations of the law. However, the nature and arrangements of review bodies 
differ widely between the countries and even – for Austria and Switzerland – from one state 
level to another.  
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